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Abstract 
 
The rapid increase in the number of open developing countries has recently caused a prolif-
eration of arguments concerning the determinants of foreign economic liberalization. In this 
emerging debate, explanations stressing the importance of economic crises, interest-group 
competition, international financial institutions, and the increase in political participation 
can be distinguished. We add a fifth explanation and suggest a model that links foreign 
economic liberalization to government fragmentation in autocratic countries. The ‘trilemma 
of the protectionist autocrat’ describes a situation in which the dominant protectionist frac-
tion in government cannot reach the three goals of high rental income, maintaining a pro-
tectionist policy and appeasing the dominated, more liberal faction simultaneously. A two-
stage non-cooperative game is developed to show that government fractionalization makes 
foreign economic liberalization more likely. Since an increase in political conflict between 
the dominant and the dominated faction increases the likelihood of a revolution, the domi-
nant faction might use policy concessions to stabilize the government. We test this claim 
with a Cox continuous time survival model with time-dependent covariates. The results 
suggest in line with our model that economic crises and government fractionalization in-
crease the likelihood of foreign economic opening, while lending by international financial 
institutions and democratization do not exert a systematic influence. 
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...deheinen rât kond ich gegeben,  
                                                           wie man driu dinc erwurbe,   
                                                             der deheinez niht verdurbe. 
Walter von der Vogelweide1   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economists and political scientists typically have explained the conditions that led govern-
ments to implement suboptimal protectionist policies. Recently, the ‘rush to free trade’ 
among developing countries, as Dani Rodrik (1994) dubbed the phenomenon, gave rise to 
an almost complete reversal of the research agenda. Since the early 1990s, the number of 
articles dealing with the determinants of foreign economic liberalization has grown stead-
ily. Perhaps surprisingly, the literatures on protectionism and on foreign economic liberali-
zation are only weakly linked. The predominant answer to the first puzzle pertaining to 
protectionism is that there are certain protectionist interests represented in the political 
arena that may capture the government. If we take this simple but nevertheless convincing 
answer for granted, how can we explain that this interest became apparently weaker over 
the last two decades? How can we explain that developing countries have “flocked to free 
trade as if it were the Holy Grail of economic development”? (Rodrik 1994: 61).  
As yet, the literature has given four prominent answers: The first explanation stresses the 
importance of economic crises. In this perspective, the debt crisis of the 1980s has weak-
ened the pro-protectionist faction in the political arena and coerced governments to liberal-
ize foreign economic policies in order to ensure economic development and thereby main-
tain political power. A second group of political economy models have moved beyond this 
view and argued that liberalization results from interest-group competition in crises-ridden 
countries. A third theoretical strand has brought institutional factors into play. It advances 
that the conditionality imposed by international financial institutions plays a crucial role. 
The fourth explanation underlines the (exogenous) increase in political participation in the 
                                                 
1  The quote is from Wolfram´s poem "Ich saz ûf eime steine". It describes a similar “trilemma 
like the one analyzed in this article.  
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developing world. Proponents of this theory usually claim that the median voter, who gen-
erates an income from labor, has an interest in free trade: Since developing countries have a 
comparative advantage in labor intense production, and since free trade favors the abundant 
factor, workers gain and capital loses. An increase in political participation should thus 
cause a reduction in barriers to trade as well as a reduction of capital controls. 
Although we have no doubt that the extant literature capture some important aspects of the 
political and economic determinants of foreign economic liberalization, they lack a well 
specified model of the political process and thus rely upon a functional theory of the politi-
cal process which possibly results in policy reforms. In seeking to fill this apparent gap, we 
argue that policy reforms result from a “trilemma” in which autocratic governments find 
themselves as a consequence of their protectionist policies. Over the long run, the trilemma 
emerges because the ruling elite can only reach two out of three goals simultaneously: the 
appropriation of rental income, its policy goals, and political stability. Taking this constel-
lation as a point of departure, we argue that foreign economic liberalization emerges a 
consequence of the “trilemma” and the attempt by crisis-ridden governments to secure their 
own political survival. In this view, democratization is an unintended consequence of failed 
attempts to stabilize the government and not a necessary precondition of economic reform.2 
Since the need to stabilize the government crucially depends upon the fractionalization of 
the government, we suggest that liberalization depends on government fractionalization 
while democratization may emerge from failed attempts to stabilize a fractionalized gov-
ernment.  
Our political explanation of economic opening is accordingly based on a game that models 
the strategic interactions between three actors: a dominating protectionist faction within the 
government, a more liberal-minded counter-elite and the domestic constituents, which we 
represent through the median member of the population.3 This conceptualization enriches 
our understanding of foreign economic liberalization since most extant models only con-
ceive of the rush to free trade as the result of a contest between two competing groups, 
                                                 
2  The existence of closed democracies proves that it is neither a sufficient condition.  
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thereby ignoring the role that the status quo interest of the ruling regime plays 
(Alesina/Drazen 1991).  
The main difference between existing explanations and our model results from the role of 
the dominant political actors. Whereas both the crises and the democratization theories 
conceptualize the autocratic government as merely depending on exogeneous forces of his-
tory, the dominant faction of our analytical framework possess the means to appease possi-
ble challenges. Most extant models of political opening focus on the escalation stage during 
which governments are not able to use such ‘carrots’, but have to rely on the ‘sticks’ of 
repression (Acemoglu/ Robinson 2000, 2001).  
The article is structured as follows: We first discuss the recent theoretical developments in 
analyzing the determinants of economic liberalization. In an attempt to more carefully 
model the political process, we present a political-economy model of policy-making in au-
tocracies. The formal framework allows us to derive the testable hypotheses that liberaliza-
tion crucially depends upon government fractionalization. Finally, we test this main hy-
pothesis in a Cox regression analysis of all underdeveloped countries that were both auto-
cratic and protectionist in 1975. The survival model indicates that government f
ization is a powerful predictor of whether or not a country liberalizes its economy. This 
result strongly supports our contention that the likelihood of economic reform is not the 
least a consequence of the power struggle between liberal and protectionist factions with
a government. We conclude with some cautionary remarks on the quality of the data used 
and the possible implications of our results for the literature on democratization and eco-
nomic development. 
ractional-
in 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
3  If the autocracy democratizes, the median member of the population becomes the median 
voter. 
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2. The Sources of Foreign Economic Liberalization: Theories and Stylized Facts  
If we take the Sachs-Warner Index4 as a benchmark, we can easily illustrate the ‘rush to 
free trade’ and see that the relative number of so-called open countries has doubled between 
1985 and 1992: 
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Fig. 2.1 The ‘Rush’ to Free Trade according to Sachs/ Warner 1995. 
 
The steep increase after 1985 was mainly driven by a change in the foreign economic pol-
icy orientation of developing countries. The significance foreign economic liberalization 
gained in the developing world has led to a proliferation of competing hypotheses. As we 
have already pointed out in the introduction, there are four distinct explanations: A first 
                                                 
4  The Sachs-Warner openness dummy is denoted 0 if a country has applied non-tariff barriers 
to trade to more than 40 percent of imported goods, or if the average tariff exceeds 40 per-
cent, or if the black market exchange rate is more than 20 percent below the official rate, or if 
a state monopoly for the most important export goods has been implemented (Sachs/ Warner 
1995: 22). 
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literature assumes that a severe economic crisis precedes the decision by governments to 
open their economy, though the causal chain varies in this literature. A second theoretical 
strand accepts that the incentive to open the economy becomes more pronounced because 
of an economic crisis, but replaces the deterministic logic of early crisis theories by more 
carefully modeling interest group behavior. A third literature places the role of foreign eco-
nomic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund at the core of explanation. Here, 
the crisis serves as a window of opportunity for international financial institutions that seek 
to influence the economic policies of countries troubled by an economic crisis. Finally, a 
fourth analytical literature mainly concentrates on institutional considerations such as the 
role of democratic government. We subsume the explanations into two broad categories, 
crises-driven and politics-driven explanations, and briefly discuss the theories:  
 
Crisis theories: In most existing models deteriorating economic conditions serve as the 
trigger mechanism starting economic policies reforms such as stabilization and foreign 
economic liberalization. Tomassi and Velasco (1996:197) even argue that it has become 
part of the new conventional wisdom on reforms that crises either facilitate or cause eco-
nomic reforms. Bresser Pereira, Maravall and Przeworski illustrate this point with examples 
from Latin America: 
“When populist leaders in Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and Brazil 
adopted non-populist policies it was because the crisis in these countries was so 
deep that even the cost of sticking to populist became higher than the cost of 
adjustment.” (Bresser Pereira et al. 1993: 57) 
Bates and Krueger similarly contend that all reforms have been undertaken 
“in circumstances when economic conditions were deteriorating. There is no 
recorded instance of the beginning of a reform program at a time when eco-
nomic growth was satisfactory.” (Bates/ Krueger 1993: 454) 
Although this interpretation is appealing at first sight, it does not offer a convincing expla-
nation for the occurrence and non-occurrence of reforms. On the contrary, the ‘law’ borders 
the tautological and trivial. According to Rodrik (1996: 27), “that reform should follow 
crisis, then, is no more surprising than smoke following fire.“  
The tautological nature of the deterministic crisis explanation becomes obvious if one 
traces the term ‘crisis’ back to its Greek origins where it had the connotation of change.  
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It also remains largely unclear whether a crisis is a necessary or a sufficient condition or a 
combination of those two prerequisites. The assumption of sufficiency renders the hypothe-
sis virtually infalsifiable, because any researcher can easily employ the fallback argument 
that the problems are not yet severe enough to justify a lack of reform (Rodrik 1996: 27). 
Hence, one needs to define at least crisis’ severity.5 If we consider the large number of re-
form delays or preemployed policy changes, the deterministic argument that a crisis neces-
sarily induces a reform turns out to be blatantly wrong (Drazen 2000: 446). The most se-
vere weakness of the hypothesis is, however, that many of its early adherents presented it in 
a functionalist fashion. This makes it impossible to understand why a country delays re-
forms that would help to sort out the economic muddle or why some governments resist all 
pressures to reform and rather do nothing.  
Recently, four possible microfoundations focusing on the behavior of interest groups have 
been suggested (Drazen 2000; Rodrik 1996): A first literature draws on Mancur Olson’s 
(1982) influential work on collective action and contends that powerful interest groups are 
able to block economic reforms. Proponents of this view contend that, as the problems ag-
gravate, the ‘redistributional coalitions’ lose so much power that a society is finally able to 
implement a reform (Nelson 1994). The second analytic strand deals with the policy-
makers’ perception of the need to reform from a purely informational vantage point. In this 
view, the autocratic rulers exhibit a status quo bias and misperceive the utility of the current 
policy (Akerlof 1991). Policy-makers only update their belief in a process of Bayesian 
learning if a crisis is severe enough (Harberger 1993). The third argument about the role of 
crisis in the political process addresses the impact of uncertainty more generally, assuming 
that actors do not know if they will belong to the group of winners or the losers of the re-
form. In this vein, only a sufficiently large deterioration of the status quo renders a reform 
feasible (Laban/ Sturzenegger 1994). All explanations do not specify how deep the prob-
                                                 
5  Drazen and Easterly (2001) define crisis severity simply by the inflation rate. This simple 
definition helps them to show that with growing severity, the likelihood of reforms becomes 
larger. They ignore, however, the fact that even without reforms hyperinflation may be unsus-
tainable. Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) suggest a wide variety of crisis indicators. 
Hausken and Plümper (2002) use their definition to estimate the crisis severity of countries 
affected by the Asian crisis by a principal component analysis. 
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lems have to become until they trigger off a change, of course. Thus, in our view only the 
fourth argument, which emphasizes the societal distribution of the costs resulting from the 
implementation of reforms, provides a causal mechanism that is both testable and non-
functionalist. These alternative models conceive of reforms as a possible consequence of a 
contest between two almost equally powerful veto-players. In the influential model of 
Alesina and Drazen (1991), a ‘war of attrition’ unfolds over which group has to bear the 
larger costs of reform. While a crisis provides the incentive for reforms, the final settlement 
of the conflict is delayed until one of the domestic groups is no longer able to hold out. Ap-
parently, political stalemate is a consequence of the way in which competing groups try to 
settle their redistributional conflict (Drazen 2000:16).  
A number of authors has suggested that the link between crisis and reforms was provided 
by the International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs’) conditionality (Harrigan 1996; Taylor 
1997). As Sebastian Edwards (1997) has pointed out, between 1985 and 1995 almost 70 
percent of the World Bank adjustment operations included at least some conditionality 
upon trade liberalization. The same holds true for the IMF’s lending to developing coun-
tries. In Dani Rodriks view (1994), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
were the clear winners of the 1980s debt crisis. As a consequence of deteriorating economic 
conditions and a huge demand for capital in the developing world, the IFIs became the 
principal sources of capital inflows and uncommonly powerful in the negotiations with de-
veloping countries’ governments.  
David Greenaway and Oliver Morrissey (1996) observe four channels of influence: In their 
view, IFIs have the ability to persuade and encourage governments to implement reforms 
aiming at the liberalization of foreign economic policies, the may monitor the implementa-
tion of reforms, they can lend some credibility to the reform packages by signaling addi-
tional financial support in case of a reform crisis, and they may reduce the expected costs of 
reforms by giving technical assistance to governments willing to implement reforms.  
The fact that almost all developing countries had to accept conditional lending from IFIs 
should make clear that we ought to be careful to formulate deterministic theories of the 
regulatory impact of IMF and World Bank conditionality. If conditional lending caused 
foreign economic opening, we should observe a much more general trend towards the liber-
 10
alization of trade and capital flows. Edwards (1997) therefore believes that the rush to free 
trade was not driven by IFIs’ intervention into the political decision-making process, but by 
changing views of the politicians and governments in the developing countries. He thus 
concludes that the World Bank has contributed somewhat, but not much to the liberaliza-
tion of trade policies. 
 
Although these advanced models are more explicit about the political process than the func-
tionalistic crisis-literature, they suffer from a couple of disadvantages. Firstly, they do not 
pay sufficient attention to the role political institutions play in the policy formation process. 
In contrast to the earlier rent-seeking literature, these models do especially not include the 
government and thus the actor who can strategically decide on the initiation and design of 
the reforms. Hence, governments are treated as choiceless agents, which have to adjust 
more or less immediately to changes in the economic environment. And secondly, in the 
absence of an easy and convincing way to test interest group models, it is hard to believe 
that a war of attrition between competing interests keeps a government from implementing 
economic policy reforms. 
 
Political Institutions and Reforms: All variants of the crisis theory treat the political system 
of the reforming country as constant. Reforms are triggered by an exogenous economic 
shock that has the same impact on all countries. However, some authors convincingly doubt 
that a crisis is a sufficient condition for reforms. In their view, ‘veto-players provide a ma-
jor obstacle for governments wanting to implement economic reforms (Tsebelis 1995; 
Hallerberg/ Basinger 1998). With a growing number of veto-players, the dominant party in 
governments must convince more actors to agree upon economic policy reforms. The more 
the preferences of the relevant actors vary, the less likely becomes the timely adjustment to 
economic crises. Zielinski (1999) stresses that “liberalization proper is likely to be preceded 
by a power struggle within the dictatorship” (Zielinski 1999: 223). Valerie Bunce even goes 
further and states that newly democratized states are less likely to open up economically 
than autocratic states. She maintains that young democracies “in which power is deconcen-
trated, institutions new, and politicians fearful of public anger and limited in their temporal 
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horizons” are particularly hard to reform (Bunce 2000: 719). Although these models have 
moved us far-away from the vagueness of general theories on revolution or democratic 
consolidations, they exclusively focus on the sticks that the authoritarian government pos-
sesses. This one-sidedness is insofar detrimental as protectionist autocracies typically pos-
sess sufficient leverage to employ the “carrot” of economic opening. 
An almost contrarily institutional explanation of foreign economic liberalization has high-
lighted the impact of democratization. A growing number of observers seem to believe that 
democratization and international economic integration do not only coincide, but the former 
process causes the latter. This is at least the main thrust of a unpublished studies by Kubota 
and Milner (2000) and Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2001). These authors argue that 
the growing influence of the median voter drives the political elite to opt for economic 
openness. In the Kubota-Milner model of domestic policy making, constituents profit from 
liberalization because of their factor endowment. The model assumes in line with the Stol-
per-Samuelson theorem that in developing countries labor benefits from the welfare gains 
that the abolishment of tariffs generates (Mayer 1984). Kubota and Milner (2000) find 
some support for this argument in their pooled cross-sectional analysis.  
Yet, a closer look at the empirical record suggests that the interpretation that ‘democracy 
moves first’ does not correspond to the path that has been chosen in a plurality of the pro-
tectionist autocracies of the 1970s. We will demonstrate this based on the Sachs Warner 
criteria that we have used in Fig. 2.1 and the evaluation of the level of democracy 
(DEMOC) of the widely used Polity dataset (Jaggers/ Gurr 1995). Our examination only 
refers to those states that were not economically closed in 1970 and simultaneously not 
sufficiently democratic. While economic opening is coded as a switch from 0 to 1 on the 
Sachs-Warner dummy variable, democratization refers to an increase in DEMOC exceed-
ing 4 points. If we use this double set of criteria and only believe that one form of opening 
has to follow the other form of opening within five years, we are able to order the countries 
within four categories. Table 1 presents this evidence. 
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 Not liberalize (within five years) Liberalize  
 
 
 
Democratize 
Argentina (1983), Brazil (1986), 
Dominica (1978), Ecuador (1979) 
El Salvador (1984), Uruguay (1985) 
Honduras (1982), Peru (1980), 
Pakistan (1988), Nigeria (1979)  
Congo (1992), Madagascar (1992) 
Bangladesh (1991), Haiti (1991)  
Zambia (1991) 
 
Bolivia (1982/1986)  
Guatemala (1986/1990)  
Nicaragua (1990/ 1992)  
Nepal (1991/1992)  
Philippines (1987/1990) 
 
 
 
Not demo-
cratize 
Iraq, Jordan, Syria  
Egypt, Yemen, Myanmar  
Angola, Central African Republic 
Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon  
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi  
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda  
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia  
Tanzania, Togo 
Chile (1976), Mexico (1987)  
Paraguay (1990), Peru (1992)  
Guayana (1989), Indonesia (1971) 
Benin (1990), Ghana (1986)  
Guinea Bissau (1987),  
Guinea (1987), Mali (1991)  
Morocco (1985), Tunisia (1989)  
Uganda (1988) 
Table 1: Categorization of countries along two dimensions. 
 
All in all, 22 autocratic countries abstained from opening up both the political and the eco-
nomic system, and 14 opted first for economic reform without experiencing a democratiza-
tion within the next five years. By contrast, at least 15 countries only democratized, but did 
not open their economy five years after the corresponding constitutional change. Among 
these countries, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras and Uruguay opened the economy 
later on. If we do not count these late-liberalizers as examples for the Kubota-Milner hy-
pothesis, only five countries have chosen to democratize first and opted afterwards, but 
within five years for economic opening.6 
The multitude of outcomes suggests that the two forms of opening a country to the outside 
world are perhaps related, but that they are rather the consequence of a common cause than 
determinants of each other. Before we suggest a theory that combines both phenomena, we 
briefly discuss the extensive literature on economic reforms. As we find none of these ap-
                                                 
 
 
 
 
6  If we stretch the definition to eight years, two other countries, Argentina and Brazil, could be 
included. This does not change the results of the statistical analysis (see section 4). 
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proaches fully satisfactory, we proceed to present an approach that more carefully models 
the underlying political processes. 
 
3. The Model with Analysis 
Foreign economic liberalization is the consequence of the rational decision by a ruling elite 
which tries to survive politically. The trilemma game that we present in this section models 
decisions of a protectionist government that may ultimately result in economic reform, if 
the government is fragmentized and the dominant protectionist faction has to appease the 
dominated, more liberal faction in an attempt to stabilize the government. We start the 
analysis be first introducing the main actors and assumptions.  
 
Assumptions: We consider three actors in our model of foreign economic liberalization in 
protectionist autocracies. Actors i and e are the dominant and dominated factions of the 
government representing the interests of the import- and export-competing sector while 
Actor c represents the domestic constituent represented by the median voter. The two gov-
ernment factions have power qi and qe, qi+qe=1, qi>qe, determined exogenously by the cur-
rent state of affairs (either by taking the relative decision power of the government factions 
into account or by assessing the influence that the competing lobbies can exert on them). 
The dominant faction i has to make two strategic choices. First, based on rental income r 
determined exogenously by the state of the economy, it determines how much of the spoils 
it can keep for itself and how much the export sector will receive. While it obtains a frac-
tion α of r, 1-α goes to e. Actor i chooses policy pi from an interval 0≤pi≤1, itself preferring 
pi=0 (protectionism). Actor e, conversely, prefers pi=1 (economic liberalization). I.e., actor 
i prefers (α,pi)=(1,0), and actor e prefers (α,pi)=(0,1). Actor c has to decide how large it 
revolutionary effort s shall be, with 0≤s≤1.  
A revolution becomes more likely if pi differs considerably from the policy pc preferred by 
actor c, and if the observed level of conflict between actors i and e is considerably large. 
Actor c has the power of exerting revolutionary effort if actor i inadequately solves what 
we call the “trilemma” of the protectionist autocrat. This triple tradeoff arises as a conse-
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quence of the need to transfer rental income r to actor e through the manipulation of α, 
choosing policy pi to satisfy actor e’s preference of pi=0, and choosing pi to satisfy actor c’s 
preference of pi=pc. We model the conflict between actors i and e over r and pi as 
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where a is a parameter that weighs the impact of deviations of α and 1-pi from qi on cr and 
cp. If α=qi which means allocation according to relative power, we assume no conflict cr=0 
over rental income since this is the best actor e can reasonably hope for. Analogously, 1-
pi=qi=1-qe does not lead to a policy conflict cr=0 since this is the best actor e can reasonably 
hope for. Division with 1-qi occurs to ensure 0≤cr and cp≤1. Observe that cr=1 when actor i 
chooses its most egoistic α=1, which yields maximum conflict between i and e over rental 
income. Analogously, cp=1 when actor i chooses its most egoistic 1-pi=1. We observe 
maximum conflict between i and e in this instance. When a>1 large deviations of α and 1-pi 
incite larger cr and cp than small deviations. Using cr and cp from (1), we model the prob-
ability 0≤β≤1 of revolution as 
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where 0≤γ,ξ≤1 are weights actor c assigns to the conflict between actors i and e over rental 
income r and policy pi, respectively. The remaining weight 1-γ-ξ is assigned by actor c to 
the conflict between actors i and c over policy pi, where actor c hopes for pi=pc which 
yields no conflict. The absolute value is taken to avoid negative conflict where actor c is 
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assumed to be equally opposed to positive and negative deviations of pi relative to its 
preferred pc. Division with pc ensures a maximum conflict probability of 1 when actor i 
chooses its most egoistic pi=0. Multiplication with s is necessary because a revolution does 
not occur (β=0) if actor c does not engage into a revolutionary effort (s=0). Conversely, if 
actor c´s revolutionary effort is maximal (s=1), a revolution occurs with probability β. The 
expected utilities of actors i and e are modeled with the Cobb-Douglas functions7 
 
( ) ,)()1()1(,)1())(1( 11 bibebibi prupru −− −−=−−= αβαβ  (3) 
 
with utility 0 if a revolution occurs with probability β, where 0≤b≤1 is a parameter. To 
avoid the two corner solutions α=1 or pi=0, we set a>1. Large deviations α=1 or pi=0 by 
actor i are thus rendered less likely since these would make revolutionary effort by actor c 
more likely. Interior solutions become, in other words, more likely if a>1. Equation (3) 
assumes that r is scaled appropriately relative to 1-pi. If r increases (decreases), rental 
income becomes more (less) important than policy in actor i’s utility. Assume that actor c 
has an effort capacity of 1 which can be allocated into revolutionary effort s, and non-
revolutionary effort (e.g. production or leisure) 1-s.8 The latter gives a guaranteed utility 1-
s. The revolutionary effort is “sunk cost” which exclusively impacts upon β in (2). The 
expected utility of actor c is 
 
[ ].1)(2)1()1)(1(1 −+−+−−=++−−−+−= rppspprppsu icaicicc βββ  (4) 
 
                                                 
7  The Cobb-Douglas function is frequently used in economics (e.g. Varian 1999:64) to model 
actors’ preferences over bundles of goods. For our case the two bundles are rental income and 
policy quantified as 1-pi for actor i and pi for actor e. 
8  A similar conception is common in economic theories of conflict. See e.g. Grossman 
(1991:913,915) where “a large number of family units <contemplating insurrection> can di-
vide the labor time of its family members among a nonnegative fraction l devoted to produc-
tion, a nonnegative fraction s devoted to soldiering, and a nonnegative fraction i devoted to 
participation in an insurrection,” where l+s+i=1. 
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A revolution does not occur with probability 1-β which gives a policy utility ic pp −−1 . 
I.e., if actor c gets its preferred policy pi=pc, its policy utility is 1, declining as pi departs 
from pc in positive or negative direction. If a revolution occurs with probability β, actor c 
receives its preferred policy utility 1 and the rental income r. This ensures that c possesses 
an incentive for revolution. 
 
The strategic choice of actor e in this analysis is constantly to push for its preferred 
(α,pi)=(0,1). If actor i does not pay sufficient heed to the interests of actors e and c, a revo-
lution occurs. Since the three utilities depend on the conflict between actors i and e over r 
and pi, and on the probability β of revolution, this allows us to analyze a two-stage game. 
Actor i moves in the first stage choosing α and pi. Taking α and pi as given, actor c moves 
in the second stage choosing s. As is common for two-stage games, we start the analysis by 
considering the decision of actor c in the second stage. Equation (5) gives that actor c 
chooses 
 
.1)(1
,1)(10
,1)(0
>+−=
=+−≤≤
<+−=
rppwhens
rppwhens
rppwhens
ica
ica
ica
β
β
β
 (5) 
 
The equation 1)( =+− rpp icaβ , where actor c is indifferent between engaging into revo-
lutionary action and staying with the status quo, is solvable w.r.t. pi as a function of α. Fig. 
3.1 demonstrates this for r=5, qi=0.6=1-qe, γ=0.1, ξ=0.4, pc=0.85, a=2. 
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Fig. 3.1 Actor c’s choice of revolution vs. no revolution when  
r=1, qi=0.6=1-qe, γ=0.1, ξ=0.4, pc=0.85. 
 
In Fig. 3.1, actor i prefers the lower-right corner (α,pi)=(1,0), while actor e prefers the up-
per-left corner (α,pi)=(0,1). Although actor c is indifferent along 1)( =+− rpp icaβ , ac-
tor i is not. Actor i’s problem is that she prefers α=1 and pi=0 which should clearly result in 
a revolutionary effort at level s=1. Actor i can be expected to choose α and pi so as to bring 
actor c as close up to choosing s=1 as possible, without actually choosing s=1. A question 
is which “safety margin” actor i should choose. Although real life is characterized by 
uncertainty, incomplete information (Harsanyi 1967/68), and bounded rationality limiting 
the capacity for processing information and preferences (Simon 1955) pertaining to the 
safety margin, our objective here as a benchmark is to determine the exact point with zero 
safety margin. The minimal safety margin amounts to a value of pi which lies ε>0 above 
player c’s indifference curve 1)( =+− rpp icaβ . Player i cannot be expected to choose 
α<0.6, which gives the horizontal line in Fig. 3.1. The choice γ=0.1 means that actor c as-
signs low weight to how actor i allocates rental income r between the dominant and 
dominated government factions. Hence in Fig. 3.1 actor i can even choose its egoistic α=1 
and avoid revolution as long as its policy concession exceeds pi>0.5. On the other hand, the 
choices ξ=0.4 and 1-γ-ξ=0.5 mean that actor c assigns high weight to actor i’s choice of 
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and 1-γ-ξ=0.5 mean that actor c assigns high weight to actor i’s choice of policy. Even with 
α<0.6 actor i needs to choose the relatively high pi>0.35 to avoid revolution, where we 
have earlier described pi=1-qi=0.4 as the best actor e can reasonably hope for given the 
power distributions between actors i and e. Since actor i prefers α>0.6, it can be expected to 
make a policy concession beyond pi=0.35. Straightforward numerical maximization for 
b=0.5 of actor i’s Cobb-Douglas utility ui in (2.3) w.r.t. α and pi gives the optimal values 
α=0.91 and pi=0.43, where ui=1.61. Especially the choice α=0.91 is an egoistic one for 
actor i. The choice pi=0.43 is better than actor e can reasonably hope for, justified by the 
high weight 1-γ-ξ=0.5 assigned to actor c’s preferred policy pc=0.85. Fig. 3.2 plots the three 
utilities ui,ue,uc, and βa as functions of pi for α=0.91 and α=0.71. 
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Fig. 3.2 Actor utilities ui,ue,uc, and βa when  
r=1, qi=0.6=1-qe, γ=0.1, ξ=0.4, pc=0.85, α=1 and α=0.6. 
 
In the event that α=0.91, ui for player i increases from 0 when pi=0, to 1.32 when pi=0.43, 
and makes a jump to 1.61 when actor c can be convinced not to cause a revolution. There-
after ui suffers a decrease as pi gets removed from the preferred pi=0. The dominated gov-
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ernment faction, actor e, has a moderate increase in ue as pi increases from 0 to 0.43, but 
enjoys an increase after the jump towards its preferred pi=1. For those values of pi where 
actor c invests in revolution (s=1), actor c’s expected utility uc is highest when the probabil-
ity β of a successful revolution is highest, which in Fig. 3.2 is the case when pi=0. uc for 
actor c decreases to a minimum for pi=0.43 with indifference between s=1 and s=0. As pi 
increases above pi=0.43 and a revolution does not occur, uc increases to a maximum for 
actor c’s preferred policy pi=pc=0.85, and declines thereafter. For α=0.71, the structure of 
the three utilities is similar. Actor i’s max utility is ui=1.5, which is lower than ui=1.61 de-
scribed above. In this case actor i prefers to transfer rental income according to the rela-
tively egoistic α=0.91, while making a considerable policy concession pi=0.43+ε, where ε 
is arbitrarily small above the safety margin. Thus, this example resembles a case in which 
the dominant faction maintains the major share of the rental income r for itself and stabi-
lizes the government by making policy concessions to both the dominated faction and the 
median member of the population. 
 
To illustrate sensitivity to parameter variation we increase γ to γ=0.7, which means that 
actor c assigns high weight to how actor i allocates rental income r between the dominant 
and dominated government factions. We further choose ξ=0.1 which implies 1-γ-ξ=0.2 
which means that actor c assigns low weight to actor i’s policy choice. Fig. 3.3 illustrates 
these choices. 
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Fig. 3.3 Actor c’s choice of revolution vs no revolution when  
r=1, qi=0.6=1-qe, γ=0.7, ξ=0.1, pc=0.85. 
 
The high weight γ=0.7 forces the protectionist actor to transfer more rental income r to ac-
tor e. For α>0.83 actor c is guaranteed to exert revolutionary effort even when actor i 
makes the most extreme policy concession pi=1. On the other hand, the low weights ξ=0.1 
and 1-γ-ξ=0.2 allow actor i to be considerably more recalcitrant w.r.t. policy concessions. 
For α<0.6 actor i avoids revolutionary effort by choosing the low and preferable pi>0.15. 
Numerical maximization for b=0.5 of ui in (2.3) w.r.t. α and pi gives the optimal values 
α=0.71 and pi=0.23, where ui=1.65. Fig. 3.4 plots the three utilities ui,ue,uc, and βa, as func-
tions of pi for α=0.91 and α=0.71. 
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Fig. 3.4 Actor utilities ui,ue,uc, and βa when r=1, qi=0.6=1-qe, γ=0.7, ξ=0.1, pc=0.85, α=1 
and α=0.74. 
 
In Fig. 3.4 actor i’s maximum utility is ui=1.65 when α=0.71 and pi=0.23+ε, which is larger 
than e.g. ui=0.89 which is the maximum that can be attained when α=0.91 and pi=0.33. 
Hence in this case actor i prefers to transfer more rental income, but to make a smaller pol-
icy concession. 
Let us define the policy under government fractionalization as pi=pig. Government fraction-
alization is expressed by the sizes of cr and cp, where a convenient measure is crcp. The 
equation (a c ip p rβ − + =) 1 determines the value of pi where actor c is indifferent between 
engaging into revolutionary action and staying with the status quo. Inserting pi=pig into this 
equation gives 
 
((1 ) 1.
a
c ig
r p c ig
c
p p
c c p p r
p
γ ξ γ ξ
  −  + + − − − + =    
)  (6) 
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We define the absence of government fractionalization as cr=cp=0, and the associated pol-
icy as pi=piw. Inserting into ( )a c ip p rβ 1− + =  gives 
 
((1 ) 1.
a
c iw
c iw
c
p p
p p r
p
γ ξ  −  − − − + =    
)  (7) 
 
Proposition: pig>piw when pc>pig, which means that government fractionalization makes 
foreign economic liberalization more likely (high pi) when the median voter also has a high 
preference for foreign economic liberalization (pc>pig). 
 
Proof. Comparing (6) and (7), equation (6) has an additional term 
(r p c igc c p p rγ ξ + −  )+  on the left hand side, where crcp>0. It thus follows directly that 
pig>piw when pc>pig. QED. 
 
Inserting the parameter values used in Figs. 3.1-3.2, i.e. r=5, qi=0.6=1-qe, γ=0.1, ξ=0.4, 
pc=0.85, a=2, into (7) gives pig=0.34, where actor i chooses its preferred α=1. I.e., the ab-
sence of government fractionalization gives (α,piw)=(1.00,0.34), in contrast to 
(α,pig)=(0.91,0.43) with government fractionalization. Inserting the parameter values used 
in Figs. 3.3-3.4, i.e. r=5, qi=0.6=1-qe, γ=0.7, ξ=0.1, pc=0.85, a=2, into (7) gives pig=0.06, 
actor i choosing α=1. The absence of government fractionalization gives 
(α,piw)=(1.00,0.06), in contrast to (α,pig)=(0.71,0.23) with government fractionalization. 
We test this hypothesis in the following section. 
 
4. A Cox Regression Analysis of the Fractionalization Hypothesis 
The objective of the following survival analysis is to investigate the asserted causal rela-
tionship between government fragmentation and foreign economic liberalization. We as-
sume that inter-factional conflict is only one of the factors determinant of economic open-
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ing and that we have to control for some other factors. Other observers have addressed the 
importance of democratization and political participation (Kubota/ Milner 2000), the num-
ber of veto players (Tsebelis 1995, Hallerberg/ Basinger 1998), IMF conditionality (Harri-
gan 1996; Taylor 1997) and the seriousness of the economic crisis (Tomassi/ Velasco 
1996). 
The statistical model estimates the impact of these variables on the likelihood of economic 
reform. Our sample consists of all countries that have been closed autocracies in 1975 
(OPEN=0 and DEMOC<5) and for which the necessary data could be collected. All basic 
economic data are from the Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6, revised December 1997, Univer-
sity of Toronto, Canada). We obtained the natural growth rate of per capita income 
(NGDPC), the share of trade as part of the gross domestic product (OPENPWT), and the 
government share of the economy (G) from this data source. The natural growth rate enters 
the regression with a lag of five years because we rely on the functionalist logic as a base-
line model that a crisis typically precedes the opening (NGDPC5). We therefore expect a 
negative sign (a hazard rate below 1) and hypothesize that the better the state of the econ-
omy was five years ago, the lower the incentive to open the economy. We also expect a 
negative sign (a hazard rate below 1) for G because an increasing government share of the 
economy allows the dominant faction to distribute more rental income and to lessen the 
degree of conflict within the government. OPENPWT, however, should enter the regression 
with a hazard ratio above 1, since a high trading share of the economy indicates a higher 
potential for gains from trade.  
We obtained the political variables from the data sets of Keefer (Beck et al. 2000). We in-
clude the number of veto players (CHECK1) and GOFRAC into the regression. GOFRAC 
measures the likelihood that two randomly drawn members of the parliament will belong to 
different parties. Specifically, the index is one minus the Herfindahl index of the govern-
ment. The Herfindahl index is a concentration measure. The value of the index, H, is the 
sum of the squares of the shares of all units q: 
 
2
1
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H q
=
= ∑  (8) 
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H approaches 1 if there is complete concentration and 0 if there is complete fractionaliza-
tion. GOFRAC, therefore, approaches the value 1 if the government under observation is 
extremely fractionalized.  
Keefer et al. have coded GOFRAC as missing values if the country under consideration is a 
pure dictatorship with no parliamentary involvement in political decision-making. We have 
re-coded these cases to 0, claiming that we observe no fractionalization. The dictatorships 
are then indistinguishable to countries with a single party government. This procedure 
would be unacceptable if we were to measure democracy or political participation. How-
ever, since GOFRAC represents government fragmentation in our empirical model and 
since we control for the level of democracy, we see no reason to isolate non-fragmentary 
autocracies from non-fragmentary democracies. Quite to the contrary, if we would not re-
code our main variable in the described manner, GOFRAC would be largely indistinguish-
able from other levels of democracy, such as Polity’s DEMOC. Admittedly, GOFRAC 
measures the potential for conflict among government factions rather than the level of con-
flict itself. But the reliance on institutional attributes rather than behavioral indicators is a 
common second-best solution in macroquantitative research. GOFRAC is definitely not the 
best proxy one can imagine, but the best that is currently available to distinguish different 
levels of fragmentation within autocracies. 
The variable CHECKS counts the number of veto players in a political system. The vari-
able is adjusted for whether these veto players are independent of each other, as determined 
by the level of electoral competitiveness in a system, their respective party affiliations, and 
the electoral rules. The inclusion of this variable clearly requires some explanation, since 
the notion of a veto player does not fit into the common and correct understanding of auto-
cratic political systems. We therefore follow the appropriate coding schema of Beck et al. 
(2000) and set CHECKS equal to 0 if the Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness is 
less than four. The idea is that “regardless of the formal constitutional arrangements, where 
legislative elections are uncompetitive, constitutional checks on officials are unlikely to be 
binding” (Beck et al. 2000: 27). In all other cases, CHECKS is increased by one in presi-
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dential systems and one for each legislative chamber. If, however, a country conducts its 
elections under closed list rules and the president’s party holds a majority in a particular 
chamber, then we can expect that the president exercises substantial control over the cham-
ber. Again in accordance with Beck et al. (2000) we do not count such constellations as an 
additional check. For parliamentary systems, CHECKS is increased by one for the prime 
minister and the number of parties in the government coalition, including the prime minis-
ter’s own party. The interpretation of CHECKS is straightforward: Autocracies are indis-
tinguishable characterized by the lack of veto-players. Countries are only able to introduce 
veto players to their political systems if they democratize. The more veto players are pre-
sent, the more is a government constrained and the more does the policy depend on the 
status quo. We therefore expect the likelihood of a foreign economic liberalization to de-
crease with a rising number of veto players. 
DEMOC and dDEMOC are taken from the Polity 98 data set. While DEMOC measures the 
level of democratization at a given time t, dDEMOC measures the first difference of this 
level compared to the level of democracy five years ago. See Gurr (1990) and Jaggers and 
Gurr (1995) for an in-depth discussion of the variables. GOFRAC, CHECKS and DEMOC 
co-vary, but the bivariate correlation only amounts to .321 (GOFRAC, CHECKS), .302 
(GOFRAC, DEMOC), and .291 (CHECKS, DEMOC). We therefore expect no serious es-
timation problems caused by the multicolinearity of the independent variables. 
A number of authors has, as outlined, argued that the rush to foreign economic liberaliza-
tion was mainly driven by the IMF conditionality (Harrigan 1996; Taylor 1997). We have 
tested this hypothesis using various operationalization: a) the cumulated amount of IMF 
credits (IMFC), b) the number of IMF credits within the previous five years (IMFCSUM) 
and c) IMF credits divided by national GDP (IMFCGDP).  
Finally, our dependent variable, opening, is a change from 0 (closed) to 1 (open) in the 
Sachs-Warner (1995) dummy variable. Their proxy is denoted 0 if a country has applied 
non-tariff barriers to trade to more than 40 percent of imported goods or if the average tariff 
exceeds 40 percent or if the black market exchange rate is more than 20 percent below the 
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official rate or if a state monopoly for the most important export goods has been imple-
mented (Sachs/ Warner 1995: 22).  
We apply a Cox regression model with time-dependent covariates (Cox 1972, 1975) to ex-
plain the event of economic opening. Continuous-time models apply partial likelihood es-
timation and yield the flexibility that one can assume time dependency without being 
forced to specify the functional form (Yamaguchi 1991: 101).  
The empirical evaluation distinguishes between five models: Model 1 represents the base-
line argument that attributes the likelihood of economic opening to the occurrence of an 
economic crisis. It equally specifies the national political system and includes measures of 
the number of veto players, the government share of the GDP, and the government frac-
tionalization index. Models 2 to 4 add DEMOC, dDEMOC, and finally both of these vari-
ables simultaneously to test the hypotheses put forward by Kubota and Milner (2000). 
Model 5 and 6 regresses the democracy variables without the variable of our main interest, 
GOFRAC. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 
NGDPC5  0.0002
-8.474 
(8.242) *** 
0.0001 
-8.788 
(10.680) **** 
0.0001 
-8.438 
(8.010) **** 
0.0005 
-7.578 
(7.854) *** 
0.0008 
-7.1647 
(6.825) *** 
0.0002 
-7.676 
(7.838) *** 
0.0002 
-7.616 
(7.518) *** 
G 0.925
-0.077 
(4.241) ** 
 0.927 
-0.076 
(4.175) ** 
0.928 
-0.075 
(3.774) * 
0.912 
-0.093 
(7.288) *** 
0.933 
-0.069 
(5.453) ** 
0.915 
-0.089 
(6.596) *** 
0.914 
-0.090 
(6.409) ** 
OPENPWT    1.021
0.020 
(2.931) * 
1.026 
0.025 
(5.192) ** 
1.020 
0.020 
(2.920) * 
1.022 
0.022 
(3.537) * 
1.022
0.022 
(3.613) * 
1.020 
0.019 
(2.662) * 
CHECK1    0.541
-0.614 
(4.540) ** 
0.558
-0.583 
(3.824) * 
0.531 
-0.634 
(4.845) ** 
0.477 
-0.741 
(6.799) *** 
0.520 
-0.654 
(5.104) ** 
0.531 
-0.633 
(4.940) ** 
GOFRAC  172.334
5.149 
(14.524) **** 
71.593 
4.271 
(12.241) **** 
133.678 
4.895 
(11.108) **** 
295.907 
5.690 
(22.080) **** 
148.267 
4.999 
(20.665) **** 
301.524 
5.709 
(21.978) **** 
271.061 
5.602 
(21.706) **** 
DEMOC      1.060
0.058 
(0.514) 
1.072 
0.070 
(0.820) 
1.087 
0.083 
0.669 
dDEMOC        0.956
-0.044 
(0.162) 
IMFC      1.539
0.431 
(0.765) 
1.575 
0.454 
(0.884) 
1.555 
0.442 
(0.789) 
IMFCSUM       1.000
0.000 
(0.271) 
 
IMFCGDP        1.000
0.000 
(0.584) 
-2LL        112.90 117.567 112.704 114.281 117.407 113.898 112.618
CHI² 36.030 **** 31.364 **** 36.106 **** 35.244 **** 39.217 **** 35.033 **** 34.683 **** 
time at risk          800 800 800 800 800 800 800
Dependent Variable: OPENEVENT (Sachs/ Warner 1995) line 1: exp(b), line 2: b, line 3: Wald (in parenthesis) 
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level, **** significant at 0.001 level. 
 
Table 2: Determinants of Foreign Economic Liberalization: A Cox Regression Analysis, 1970-1992. 
The first column presents the baseline Cox-regression-model as specified above. All 
beta coefficients turn up with the expected sign. A high share of trade to GDP, low 
levels of government fractionalization and increasing growth rates in subsequent 
years, a large number of veto players, and a high ratio of government consumption to 
GDP reduce the likelihood of economic opening. Although GOFRAC is not an opti-
mal operationalization for political conflict between government fractions, the results 
nevertheless highlight the astonishingly large importance of government fractional-
ization for foreign economic liberalization in accordance to our model. Ceteris pari-
bus, countries with extremely fractionalized governments are about six times more 
likely to open their economy compared to states without government fractionaliza-
tion. We therefore tend to interpret these results as a first confirmation of our theo-
retical model. An equally sized effect results from an economic crisis. Moreover, add-
ing one veto player to a political system reduces the relative likelihood of an eco-
nomic opening by approximately 20 percent. 
Models 2 to 4 show that adding the democracy index or the first derivative in the 
level of democracy does not improve the model. The variable DEMOC enters the 
regressions with the sign expected by Kubota and Milner, but the impact of democ-
racy on the relative likelihood of economic opening is small and remains insignifi-
cant. The estimated coefficient for DDEMOC has the wrong sign and remains far 
from reaching a conventional level of significance. However, if we suppress 
GOFRAC from the model, DEMOC as well as DDEMOC enter the regression sig-
nificantly, though DDEMOC preserves its negative sign, thus falsifying the Kubota-
Milner hypothesis.  
As models 1-3 and 6 and 7 demonstrate, none of the operationalizations of the IFI’s 
variable turned out to be significantly correlated with our dependent variable. The 
only impact of IMF lending seems to result from the amount of money the IMF trans-
fer to the debtor country. Since this variable tends to be highly correlated with crisis’ 
severity, an interpretation of the results remains difficult. We may therefore conclude 
our discussion on IMF conditionality by borrowing a quote from Dani Rodrik, who 
claimed:  
“That the world bank and the IMF became uncommonly powerful in their deal-
ings with the governments in developing countries during the 1980s is indisput-
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able. Yet it would be a mistake to picture the process of policy reform as one in 
which orthodox economic policies were externally imposed on unwilling poli-
cymakers. (…) More often than not, reform has had a significant homegrown 
component.” (Rodrik 1994: 75) 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the impact of the domestic political processes between the 
dominant protectionist faction and a pro-liberalization faction in autocratic regimes 
on the likelihood of economic opening. It has shown that the intensifying contestation 
between competing élites is a major driving force in what Dani Rodrik called ‘the 
rush to free trade’ in autocratic regimes. We have shown formally in a game model 
and statistically with Cox regression analysis  that the emergence of conflict between 
competing factions in an authoritarian government exerts a positive impact on the 
liberalization process.  
This result and the accompanying evaluation of competing hypotheses have several 
theoretical implications. First, our model of the decision making process strongly 
suggests that examinations of economic opening should move beyond the functional-
ist logic that economic crises is a sufficient condition of liberalization. The empirical 
analysis supports the political economy hypothesis that the internal power allocation 
of a country affects the possibility that it will open up. We move, however, beyond 
the standard interest group competition hypotheses that is the base of Alesina and 
Drazen’s (1991) pioneering contribution. In contrast to their ‘war of attrition’ model, 
our model includes the government as a strategic actor and conceives of economic 
opening as the consequence of concessions of the protectionist to the liberal faction in 
an authoritarian regime.  
A second contribution of this article is some tentative support for the argument that 
can be derived from the veto player literature. According to this important theoretical 
strand in Comparative Political Economy, economic opening becomes less likely, the 
more veto players a country possesses. We show that this does not hold true.9 Despite 
the mere statistical regularity, one should be aware that such arguments are too for-
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malist as long as they do not come up with a sensible measure of the veto players’ 
attitude towards economic reform.  
Third, this paper shows that democratization is not a necessary precondition of eco-
nomic opening. On the contrary, democratization seems to become more likely, the 
more divided an authoritarian government is. The government fractionalization of 
authoritarian regimes, in other words, seems to be a major link in the possible rela-
tionship between political institutions and economic development. The relative power 
of liberal interest groups is therefore key for our understanding of transformation 
processes in the developing world.  
Future work has to show whether the findings reported are stable once we move to 
other research designs or rely on other indicators to measure the relative power of 
competing élites. We acknowledge that our main indicator exhibits some weaknesses, 
most notably that it measures an institutional variable while we are rather interested 
in elite behavior. These drawbacks do, however, not too much impinge on the general 
thrust of this study that the political economy models should rely on a more focused 
conceptualization of the domestic political process to account for the sources of eco-
nomic opening. As this analysis shows, dichotomizing between democracies and au-
tocracies is simply not enough to understand the ‘rush to free trade’.  
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